Remarks As Prepared for Delivery of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s “New Approach to the U.S.-China Trade Relationship” October 04, 2021 WASHINGTON – United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai today delivered remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s new approach to the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship. You can watch the remarks live at www.csis.org/events/conversation-ambassador-katherinetai-us-trade-representative. Ambassador Tai’s remarks as prepared for delivery are below: Hello, everyone. Thank you for being here. I want to thank John Hamre, Bill Reinsch, and the Center for Strategic & International Studies for hosting me today. CSIS plays a vital role in our foreign policy discourse. It is fitting that I am here speaking to you about one of the most important global issues. I have said this before and I will continue to say it: the U.S.-China trade and economic relationship is one of profound consequence. As the two largest economies in the world, how we relate to each other does not just affect our two countries. It impacts the entire world and billions of workers. This bilateral relationship is complex and competitive. President Biden welcomes that competition to support American workers, grow our economy, and create jobs at home. He believes we need to manage the competition responsibly – and ensure that it is fair. For too long, China’s lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world. In recent years, Beijing has doubled down on its state-centered economic system. It is increasingly clear that China’s plans do not include meaningful reforms to address the concerns that have been shared by the United States and many other countries. We have a lot of work to do. To be successful, we must be direct and honest about the challenges we face and the grave risk from leaving them unaddressed. We must explore all options to chart the most effective path forward. When it comes to our relationship with China, what’s best for American workers is growing the American economy to create more opportunity and more jobs with better wages here in the United States. As the United States Trade Representative, I intend to deliver on President Biden’s vision for a worker-centered trade policy in the U.S.-China trade dynamic. We need to show that trade policy can be a force for good in the lives of everyday people. We will create durable trade policy that benefits a broad range of stakeholders by rebuilding trust with our workers and aligning our domestic and foreign policies. President Biden has been clear: the key to our global competitiveness and creating shared prosperity begins at home. We have to make smart domestic investments to increase our own competitiveness. We must invest in research and development and clean energy technology, strengthen our manufacturing base, and incentivize companies to Buy American up and down the supply chain. We already accomplished some of that work with the American Rescue Plan, the Administration’s focus on supply chain resilience, and our investments in our technological leadership. The Administration is working closely with Congress to build on those actions with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal and the Build Back Better agenda. In terms of U.S.-China trade, in recent months, the Biden-Harris Administration has conducted a comprehensive review. And today, I will lay out the starting point of our Administration’s strategic vision for realigning our trade policies towards China to defend the interests of America’s workers, businesses, farmers and producers, and strengthen our middle class. First, we will discuss with China its performance under the Phase One Agreement. China made commitments that benefit certain American industries, including agriculture, that we must enforce. President Biden will continue to promote our economic interests – and build confidence for American industry. Second, we will start a targeted tariff exclusion process. We will ensure that the existing enforcement structure optimally serves our economic interests. We will keep open the potential for additional exclusion processes, as warranted. Third, we continue to have serious concerns with China’s state-centered and non-market trade practices that were not addressed in the Phase One deal. As we work to enforce the terms of Phase One, we will raise these broader policy concerns with Beijing. And we will use the full range of tools we have and develop new tools as needed to defend American economic interests from harmful policies and practices. Finally and critically, we will continue to work with allies to shape the rules for fair trade in the 21st century, and facilitate a race to the top for market economies and democracies. Before I get into further details around our plans, I would like to reflect on how the U.S.-China trade relationship has evolved in recent decades – and how we got to where we are today. From the late 1970s to mid-1980s, China went from the world’s eleventh-largest economy to the eighth-largest. U.S. exports to China increased approximately four-fold, while imports grew 14 times in less than 1 0 years. This economic growth set the stage for China’s efforts to join the WTO. The world faced an important challenge at that time: how to integrate a state-led economy into a trade institution created by those dedicated to open, market-oriented principles. In grappling with this dilemma, some believed there would be huge boosts in industrial and agricultural exports to China and its growing middle class. Others argued that accelerated and massive job losses would result. In the end, China officially joined the WTO in December 2001. Over the next decade and a half, the United States pursued a dual-track approach with Beijing. One track involved annual high-level dialogues between U.S. and Chinese officials over three successive presidential administrations. These talks were intended to push China towards complying with and internalizing WTO rules and norms, and making other market-oriented changes. But those commitments became more difficult to secure over the years, and China’s followthrough was inconsistent and impossible to enforce. The other track focused on dispute settlement cases at the WTO. We brought 27 cases against China, including some I litigated myself, and through collaboration with our allies. We secured victories in every case that was decided. Still, even when China changed the specific practices we challenged, it did not change the underlying policies, and meaningful reforms by China remained elusive. In recent years, China’s leaders have doubled-down on their state-centric economic model. Faced with the reality that neither the dialogue nor the enforcement tracks were producing meaningful changes, the previous administration decided to use a different paradigm – unilateral U.S. pressure – to try to change Beijing’s practices. It launched an investigation focused on China’s forced IP and technology transfer policies – longstanding and serious problems. This led to substantial U.S. tariffs on imports from China – and retaliation by China. Against this backdrop of rising tensions, in January 2020, the previous administration and China agreed to what is commonly referred to as the “Phase One Agreement.” This agreement includes a limited set of commitments. These cover China’s obligations regarding intellectual property and technology transfer, purchases of American products, and improved market access for the agriculture and financial services sectors. It has stabilized the market, especially for U.S. agricultural exports. But our analysis indicates that while commitments in certain areas have been met, and certain business interests have seen benefits, there have been shortfalls in others. But the reality is, this agreement did not meaningfully address the fundamental concerns that we have with China’s trade practices and their harmful impacts on the U.S. economy. Even with the Phase One Agreement in place, China’s government continues to pour billions of dollars into targeted industries and continues to shape its economy to the will of the state – hurting the interests of workers here in the U.S and around the world. Let’s look at the steel industry. In 2000, there were more than 100 U.S. steel companies. We produced 100 million metric tons of steel annually and the industry employed 136,000 people in communities across the country. Soon after, China started building its own steel plants. Its production capacity ballooned, depriving U.S. steel companies of valuable market opportunities. Low priced Chinese steel flooded the global market, driving out businesses in the United States and around the world. Every steel plant that shuttered left hundreds of workers without livelihoods. It also left communities reeling, as small businesses dependent on plants also closed their doors and blighted buildings brought down real estate values. Today, China produces over one billion metric tons annually – and accounts for nearly 60 percent of global steel production. China produces more steel in a single month than the United States and most other countries in the world produce in an entire year. In the U.S., employment in the steel industry has dropped 40 percent since 2000. We see the impact of China’s unfair policies in the production of photovoltaic solar cells. The United States was once a global leader in what was then an emerging industry. But as China built out its own industry, our companies were forced to close their doors. Today, China represents 80 percent of global production – and large parts of the solar supply chain don’t even exist in the United States. U.S. agriculture has not been spared either. While we have seen more exports to China in recent years, market share is shrinking and agriculture remains an unpredictable sector for U.S. farmers and ranchers who have come to rely heavily on this market. China’s regulatory authorities continue to deploy measures that limit or threaten the market access for our producers – and their bottom line. We also see troubling dynamics playing out today with the semiconductor industry. In 2014, China issued an industrial plan to announce “the goal of establishing a world-leading semiconductor industry…by 2030.” Reportedly, China has already spent at least $150 billion on this effort, with more on the way. Its intentions are clear, just as they were with steel and solar. Those policies have reinforced a zero-sum dynamic in the world economy where China’s growth and prosperity come at the expense of workers and economic opportunity here in the U.S. and other market-based, democratic economies. That is why we need to take a new, holistic, and pragmatic approach in our relationship with China that can actually further our strategic and economic objectives – for the near-term and the long-term. As our economic relationship with China evolves, so too must our tactics to defend our interests. As the years go by, the stakes keep getting higher and boosting American competitiveness becomes all the more important. Our strategy must address these concerns, while also being flexible and agile to confront future challenges from China that may arise. So how do we accomplish this? Unlike the past, this administration will engage from a position of strength because we are investing in our workers and our infrastructure. Repairing our roads and bridges, modernizing our ports, and delivering expanded broadband are the kinds of investments that will begin to give American workers and businesses the boost needed to embrace their global competitiveness. And we must harness and leverage the talent of our people by investing in education and worker training – investments that are included in the President’s Build Back Better plan. We also need to re-double our own efforts to be the most innovative country in the world by researching, developing, and creating new and emerging technology. China and other countries have been investing in their infrastructure for decades. If we are going to compete in the global market, we need to make equal or greater investments here at home. That continuous investment ensures we can maintain our competitive edge throughout the 21st century. Beyond our domestic investments, in the coming days, I intend to have frank conversations with my counterpart in China. That will include discussion over China’s performance under the Phase One Agreement. And we will also directly engage with China on its industrial policies. Our objective is not to inflame trade tensions with China. Durable coexistence requires accountability and respect for the enormous consequences of our actions. I am committed to working through the many challenges ahead in this bilateral process in order to deliver meaningful results. But above all else, we must defend – to the hilt – our economic interests. That means taking all steps necessary to protect ourselves against the waves of damage inflicted over the years through unfair competition. We need to be prepared to deploy all tools and explore the development of new ones, including through collaboration with other economies and countries. And we must chart a new course to change the trajectory of our bilateral trade dynamic. And vitally, we will work closely with our allies and like-minded partners towards building truly fair international trade that enables healthy competition. I have been working to strengthen our alliances through bilateral, regional, and multilateral engagement. And I will continue to do so. The agreements we reached in June with the EU and the UK to resolve the large civil aircraft disputes at the WTO demonstrate President Biden’s commitment to work with our partners to create a more level playing field for our workers. Just last week, I co-chaired the first meeting of the U.S.-E.U. Trade and Technology Council. As Europe strengthens its own defenses against non-market practices, we will work with them to ensure that our collective policies deliver. In the G7, G20, and at the WTO, we are discussing market distortions and other unfair trade practices, such as the use of forced labor in the fisheries sector, and in global supply chains, including in Xinjiang. In the coming months and years, we will build off of this work. Our goal is to bring deliberative, stable, long-term thinking to our approach – and to work through bilateral and multilateral channels. The core of our strategy is a commitment to ensuring we work with our allies to create fair and open markets. There is a future in which all of us in the global economy can grow and succeed – where prosperity is inclusive within our own borders and across those borders too. The path we have been on did not take us there. President Biden’s priorities that I’ve laid out today are aimed at achieving a shared prosperity that is good for our workers, producers, and businesses; good for our allies; and good for the global economy. Thank you. 美国贸易代表戴琪周一（10 月 4 日）在战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）发表讲话，概述拜登哈里斯政府对美中双边贸易关系的新方针。以下是演讲全文： 大家好。 感谢你们来到这里。 我想感谢约翰·哈姆雷、比尔·林施和战略与国际研究中心今 天邀请我。 CSIS 在我们的外交政策讨论中发挥着重要作用。 我在这里向你们谈论最重要 的全球问题之一是很合适的。 我以前说过，并将继续这么说：美中贸易和经济关系是一个具有深远影响的关系。 作为世 界上最大的两个经济体，美中之间的关系不仅影响我们两个国家，它影响到整个世界和数十 亿的工人。 这种双边关系是复杂和竞争的。 拜登总统欢迎这种竞争，以支持美国工人，发展我们的经 济，并在国内创造就业机会。 他认为，我们需要负责任地管理这种竞争关系，并确保这种竞争是公平的。 长期以来，中国不遵守全球贸易规范，削弱了美国人和世界各地其他人民的成功。 近年来，中国政府已经加倍强调其以国家为中心的经济体系。 越来越清楚的是，中国的计 划不包括有意义的改革，以解决美国和许多其他国家共同关注的问题。 我们有很多工作要做。 为了取得成功，我们必须直接和诚实地说明我们所面临的挑战，以及不解决这些问题的严重 风险。 我们必须探索所有选项，以制定最有效的前进道路。 当谈到美中关系时，对美国工人最有利的是发展美国经济，在美国本土创造更多就业机会和 更多工资更高的工作。 作为美国贸易代表，我打算在美中贸易发展中实现拜登总统关于以工人为中心的贸易政策的 愿景。 我们需要表明，贸易政策可以成为普通人生活中的一种向好的力量。 我们将通过与工人重建信任，并使国内政策和外交政策保持一致，创造持久的贸易政策，使 广泛的利益相关者受益。 拜登总统一直说的很清楚：美国的全球竞争力和创造共同繁荣的关键源于国内。 我们必须 进行明智的国内投资，以提高自己的竞争力。 我们必须投资于研发和清洁能源技术，加强 制造业基础，并激励公司在供应链的上下游购买美国货。 我们已经通过美国救援计划、政府对供应链复原力的关注以及对技术领导力的投资完成了其 中的一些工作。 政府正在与国会紧密合作，通过两党基础设施协议和重建更好未来的议程， 在这些行动的基础上再接再厉。 在美中贸易方面，最近几个月，拜登-哈里斯政府已经进行了全面审查。 今天，我将阐述政府重新调整对华贸易政策战略愿景的出发点，以捍卫美国工人、企业、农 民和生产者的利益，并壮大我们的中产阶级。 首先，我们将与中国讨论其在美中贸易第一阶段协议下的表现。 中国做出了有利于包括农 业在内的某些美国产业的承诺，我们必须执行这些承诺。 拜登总统将继续促进我国的经济利益，并为美国工业建立信心。 第二，我们将启动一个有针对性的关税排除程序。 我们将确保现有的执法结构以最佳方式 服务于经济利益，保持开放的可能性，以便在必要时进行额外的排除程序。 第三，我们继续对中国以国家为中心和非市场的贸易做法表示严重关切，这些做法在第一阶 段协议中没有得到解决。 在努力执行第一阶段的条款时，我们将向中国政府提出这些更广 泛的政策关切。 我们将使用全部现有方法，并根据需要创造新的方式，以保护美国的经济利益不受有害政策 和做法的影响。 最后，至关重要的是，我们将继续与盟国合作，为 21 世纪的公平贸易制定规则，并促进市 场经济和民主国家的竞争。 在我围绕这些计划进一步讨论细节之前，我想反思一下美中贸易关系在最近几十年是如何演 变的，以及美国是如何走到今天的。 从 1970 年代末到 1980 年代中期，中国从世界第十一大经济体变成第八大经济体。 美国对 中国的出口增长了约 4 倍，而进口在不到 10 年的时间里增长了 14 倍。 这种经济增长为中国加入世贸组织的努力创造了条件。 当时，世界面临着一个重要的挑战：如何将一个国家主导的经济纳入一个由那些致力于开放、 市场导向原则的国家所建立的贸易机构。 在解决这一难题的过程中，一些人认为，对中国及其不断增长的中产阶级的工业和农业出口 将有巨大的推动作用。 而另一些人则认为，这将导致就业机会的加速和大量流失。 最后，中国于 2001 年 12 月正式加入世贸组织。 在接下来的 15 年里，美国对中国采取了双轨制的做法。 一条轨道是在连续三届总统任期内，美国和中国官员之间每年进行高级别对话。 这些会谈 旨在推动中国遵守和内化世贸组织的规则和规范，并进行其他市场导向的变革。 但多年来，这些承诺变得更加难以保证，而中国的后续行动也缺乏连续性，无法执行。 另一个轨道侧重于世贸组织的争端解决案件。 我们提出了 27 个针对中国的案件，包括一些 我自己提出的诉讼，以及通过与盟国合作提出的诉讼。 我们在每一个被裁决的案件中都取 得了胜利。 然而，即使中国改变了我们所质疑的具体做法，它也没有改变基本的政策，有 意义的改革仍然遥遥无期。 近年来，中国的领导人加倍地坚持他们以国家为中心的经济模式。 面对对话和执法途径都没有产生有意义的变化这一现实，上届政府（即特朗普政府）决定使 用一种不同的模式，即来自美国单方面的压力，来试图改变中国的做法。 它启动了一项调查，重点是中国的强制知识产权和技术转让政策，该政策长期存在严重的问 题。 这导致了美国对从中国进口的产品征收大量关税，以及中国的报复行为。 在这种紧张 局势加剧的背景下，2020 年 1 月，前任政府和中国达成了通常被称为“第一阶段协议”的贸 易协议。 该协议包括一套有限的承诺，涵盖了中国在知识产权和技术转让方面的义务，购买美国产品， 以及改善农业和金融服务部门的市场准入。 该协议稳定了市场，特别是对美国农产品出口而言。但我们的分析表明，虽然某些领域的承 诺得到了履行，某些商业从中获益，但在其他方面却存在不足。 现实是，这项协议并没有有意义地解决我们对中国的贸易行为的基本关切，及其对美国经济 的有害影响。 即使有了第一阶段协议，中国政府仍继续向目标行业投入数十亿美元，并继续按照国家的意 愿塑造其经济，这损害了美国和世界各地工人的利益。 让我们看一下钢铁行业。 在 2000 年，美国有超过 100 家钢铁公司。 我们每年生产 1 亿吨 的钢铁，该行业在全国各地雇用了 13.6 万人。 不久之后，中国开始建立自己的钢铁厂。 它的生产能力膨胀，剥夺了美国钢铁公司的宝贵 市场机会。 低价的中国钢铁充斥着全球市场，赶走了美国和世界各地的企业。 每个关闭的钢铁厂都使数百名工人失去了生计。 它还使社区陷入困境，因为依赖工厂的小 企业也关闭了大门，受影响的建筑使房地产价值下降。 如今，中国的钢铁年产量超过 10 亿吨，占全球钢铁产量的近 60%。 中国一个月的钢铁产量 比美国和世界上大多数其他国家一整年的产量还要多。 在美国，自 2000 年以来，钢铁行业 的就业率已经下降了 40%。 我们在光伏太阳能电池的生产中看到了中国不公平政策的影响。 美国曾经是当时这个新兴 产业的全球领导者。 但随着中国建立起自己的产业，我们的公司被迫关闭了大门。 如今，中国的光伏太阳能电池占全球产量的 80%，而太阳能供应链的很大一部分甚至在美国 都不存在。 美国农业也未能幸免。 虽然近年来我们看到对中国的出口增加了，但市场份额正在缩小， 对于已经严重依赖这个市场的美国农民和牧场主来说，农业仍然是一个不可预测的行业。 中国的监管当局继续部署措施，限制或威胁美国生产者的市场准入，挑战他们的底线。 我们还看到今天在芯片行业出现了令人不安的情况。 2014 年，中国发布了一项工业计划， 宣布“到 2030 年建立一个世界领先的芯片产业”的目标。 据报道，中国已经在这个领域花费 了至少 1500 亿美元，还有更多即将投入。中国的意图很明显，就像其对钢铁和太阳能行业 那样。 这些政策加强了世界经济中的零和状态，中国的增长和繁荣是以牺牲美国和其他基于市场的 民主经济体的工人和经济机会为代价的。 这就是为什么我们需要在美中关系中采取一种新的、全面的和务实的方法，能够真正促进我 们的战略和经济目标，无论是从短期还是长期来看。 随着我们与中国经济关系的发展，我们捍卫利益的策略也必须改变。 随着时间的推移，赌 注越来越大，提高美国的竞争力变得更加重要。 我们的战略必须解决这些问题，同时也要灵活和敏捷地应对未来可能出现的来自中国的挑 战。 那么，我们如何实现这一目标？ 与过去不同的是，本届政府将从增强自身实力出发，我们正在投资于工人和基础设施。 修复道路和桥梁，使港口现代化，并提供扩大的宽带，这些投资将开始给美国工人和企业提 供所需的动力，以增强他们的全球竞争力。 我们必须通过投资于教育和工人培训来利用和发挥人民的才能，这些投资包括在拜登总统 “重建更好未来”的计划中。我们还需要重新加倍努力，通过研究、开发和创造新兴的技术， 成为世界上最具创新性的国家。 中国和其他国家几十年来一直在投资于他们的基础设施。 如果我们要在全球市场上竞争， 需要在国内进行同等或更大的投资。 这种持续的投资确保我们能够在整个 21 世纪保持竞争优势。 除了国内投资，在未来几天，我打算与我在中国的同级官员进行坦诚的对话。 这将包括讨论中国在第一阶段贸易协议下的表现，还将包括直接与中国就其工业政策进行接 触，但这么做的目标不是要激化与中国的贸易紧张关系。 持久的共存需要对行动的巨大后果负责和尊重。 我致力于解决这一双边进程中未来的许多 挑战，以取得有意义的结果。 但最重要的是，我们必须全力捍卫美国的经济利益。 这意味着采取一切必要步骤，使我们免受多年来因不公平竞争而造成的一次次损害。 我们 需要准备好部署所有的方式并探索开发新的方式，包括通过与其他经济体和国家合作。 我 们必须制定一个新的路线，以改变我们双边贸易发展的轨迹。 而且至关重要的是，我们将与我们的盟友和志同道合的伙伴密切合作，以建立真正公平的国 际贸易，使健康的竞争成为可能。 我一直在努力通过双边、区域和多边接触加强我们的联盟。 而且我将继续这样做。 我们在 6 月与欧盟和英国达成的解决世贸组织大型民用飞机争端的协议表明，拜登总统致 力于与伙伴合作，为工人创造一个更公平的竞争环境。 就在上周，我共同主持了美国-欧盟贸易和技术委员会的第一次会议。 随着欧洲加强其自身 对非市场行为的防御，我们将与他们合作，以确保我们的集体政策取得成效。 在七国集团、二十国集团和世贸组织，我们正在讨论市场扭曲和其他不公平的贸易做法，如 在渔业部门和全球供应链中使用强迫劳动，包括在新疆。 在未来几个月和几年里，我们将以这项工作为基础。 我们的目标是为这些做法带来深思熟虑的、稳定的、长期的思考，并通过双边和多边渠道开 展工作。 我们战略的核心是致力于确保美国与盟友合作，创造公平和开放的市场。 未来，我们所有的人在全球经济中都能成长和成功，在国界内外，都能取得包容性的繁荣。 我们目前所走的道路并不能把我们带到那里。我今天提到的拜登总统的优先事项旨在实现共 同繁荣，这对我们的工人、生产者和企业有利；对我们的盟友有利；对全球经济有利。 谢谢。
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